Review 2020

Firms' method of pay and the retention of apprentices

Oxford Economic Papers
Journal · Vol. 72 · Issue 1 · pp. 269-291
Abstract

The new training literature views regulated labour markets as critical for firms' willingness to participate in apprenticeship training. These regulations allow training firms to retain their apprenticeship graduates at the end of the training period and recoup training costs. Yet, in spite of an only loosely regulated labour market, many Swiss firms offer and pay for training. Using representative data from a large employer-employee survey, we investigate whether these firms use performance pay to retain their graduates. We find that both the magnitude and the likelihood of performance pay are significantly related to a firm's retention success. © 2019 Oxford University Press 2019. All rights reserved.

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Index Keywords

training literature review labor market Switzerland cost industrial practice regulatory framework
Author Affiliations
Universität Zürich, Zurich, ZH, Switzerland
Swiss National Bank, Zurich, ZH, Switzerland
Funding & Acknowledgements
Staatssekretariat für Bildung, Forschung und Innovation, SBFI
This work was supported by the Swiss State Secretariat for Education, Research and Innovation through its Leading House on the Economics of Education, Firm Behavior and Training Policies.
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