This paper examines how collective skill formation systems balance economic objectives related to competitiveness and social objectives related to inclusion. Based on a simple theoretical model, we argue that there are clear limits to how much inclusiveness can be achieved in collective skill formation systems. Firms are generally successful in resisting pressure by governments to be more inclusive because they benefit from their structural power in collective skill formation systems. Therefore, most pro-inclusiveness policies in such training systems do not require any firm-specific involvement. If pro-inclusiveness policies involve firms, employer associations typically participate in their development, trying to align the goal of inclusion with the economic interest of employers. Our two-level game model helps to understand this complex interaction between governments and firms. Empirical examples substantiate our expectations. They show how important it is to consider both levels simultaneously when analyzing inclusion-oriented training policy reforms. © 2020 Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group.
Author Keywords
Index Keywords
