Article 2011

On-the-job training and rigidity of employment protection in the developing world: Evidence from differential enforcement

Labour Economics
Journal · Vol. 18 · Issue SUPPL. 1 · pp. S71-S82
Abstract

This paper analyzes the causal effect between strict employment protection regulations and the firm incentive to invest in job training of their employees. We explore a large firm level data set across several developing countries and assume that the rigidity of labor regulations affects more the investment decision of firms that faces a rigid enforcement of labor regulations. Our findings show that differences across countries in the enforcement of more rigid employment protection regulation are associated with very small differences in the investment in job training across firms. This finding is robust across several specifications and samples. © 2011.

Keywords

Author Keywords

On-the-job training Employment protection Enforcement regulations Firm level data

Index Keywords

Author Affiliations
The World Bank, USA, Washington, D.C., United States
The World Bank, USA, Washington, D.C., United States
Funding & Acknowledgements
World Bank Group, WBG
The paper circulated with earlier title “Labor Market Regulations and the Investment in Job Training in Developing Countries”. We are very grateful to the editor and the two anonymous referees for extremely useful and detailed comments on earlier drafts. Special thanks go to Pedro Carneiro for several discussions and for Jaime Jesus for research assistance. We also thank the participants in the Employment and Development IZA-World Bank conference (Morocco), especially those of Jean Fares, Nina Pavnick and Joana Silva, participants at the 2008 annual meetings of the European Economic Association (Universita Bocconi, Milan), participants at the 2008 annual meetings of the European Association of Labor Economists (Amsterdam), and participants in a World Bank Brown Bag session, especially Mary Hallward-Driemier. We are also grateful to Carmen Pagés for sharing with us the job reallocation data used in Micco and Pagés (2007) and originally used in Davis and Haltiwanger (1999). This project would not have been possible without the financial support of the World Bank Research Support Grant granted to Rita Almeida. The findings expressed in this paper are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the World Bank.
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